Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The Regressive Profile of a  Hidden Tax by Carolina, Robert A. & Bloche, M. Gregg
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 2 | Issue 2
1992
Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The
Regressive Profile of a "Hidden Tax"
Robert A. Carolina
M. Gregg Bloche
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Carolina and M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The Regressive Profile of a "Hidden Tax", 2 Health
Matrix 141 (1992)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol2/iss2/4
PAYING FOR
UNDERCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: THE
REGRESSIVE PROFILE
OF A "HIDDEN TAX"
Robert A. Carolinat
and M Gregg Blochet
TO AN unprecedented degree, federal and state law today obliges
private, not-for-profit hospitals to provide free care for the poor.
In 1986, Congress required hospitals receiving Medicare reimburse-
ment to treat all patients who present themselves with medical
emergencies or who are in active labor, regardless of their ability to
pay.1 Many state legislatures have also enacted laws barring the
transfer or discharge of emergency patients against their will be-
cause of inability to pay.2 Moreover, for the last decade, federal
regulations have imposed free care obligations on hospitals that re-
ceived federal aid under the Hill-Burton program,' which financed
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1. The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1986)) (COBRA forbids the transfer of any patient
with an "emergency medical condition" or "in active labor" to another facility unless hospi-
tal personnel certify that the medical benefits of transfer outweigh its risks or the patient (or
another, legally responsible person acting on the patient's behalf) requests the transfer). See
generally Andrew J. McClura, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against
Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 173, 190-197 (1989); Demetrios G. Metropou-
los, Note, Son of COBRA: The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Law, 45 STAN. L. REV.
263, 265-67 (1992); Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the Co-
bra's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 28 (1986).
2. Judith Waxman & Stan Dom, States Take the Lead in Preventing Patient Dumping,
22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 136 (1988); Timothy G. Himes, Sr., Note, "No Dumping Al-
lowed'" Has Arizona Solved the Patient-Dumping Problem?, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1137 (1989).
3. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982 & Supp.
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construction by not-for-profit hospitals from 1946 to 1974 in ex-
change for pledges to provide free care.' In addition, a growing
number of states and localities are conditioning hospitals' property
tax exemptions upon their provision of minimum levels of uncom-
pensated care.
This last development could be a harbinger of things to come.
The U.S. Treasury Department's long-standing policy of exempting
not-for-profit hospitals from federal income taxation 6 without re-
gard for their volumes of uncompensated care has come under
growing criticism. Scholars, elected officials, and others concerned
about the availability of health care to the poor are urging that the
exemption be withdrawn from hospitals that do not provide uncom-
pensated care, or community services equal to its economic value.7
Two bills introduced during the last session of Congress would tie
V 1987) (establishing program of federal assistance to states to fund grants, loans, and loan
guaranties for hospital construction and modernization).
4. Hill-Burton grants and loans were conditioned upon promises by recipients that
they would provide a "reasonable volume" of uncompensated services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 291c(e)(2). However, recipients often failed to honor these assurances, and the federal gov-
ernment made no effort to enforce them during the first quarter century of the program.
Lawrence A. Schneider, Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospi-
tals, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 351 (1973); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 269 (1978). In 1979, the
Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Dept. of Health and Human Services
(HHS)) issued regulations specifying Hill-Burton recipients' free and below-cost care obliga-
tions in financial terms. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (1987). These obligations were affirmed in
American Hospital Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
958 (1984). The 1979 regulations also obliged HHS to investigate allegations of non-compli-
ance and gave private parties the right to seek judicial enforcement of free care obligations.
42 C.F.R. § 124.511 (1987). In the 1980s, HHS enforcement policy was lax, to say the least.
See National Health Law Program, Hill-Burton, New Developments (June 1987) (only 38
decisions by HHS in uncompensated care cases in 1986; hospitals won in 34 of these).
5. John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax Exemption for Nonprofit
Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 7-9 (1992) [hereinafter Co-
lombo & Hall]; N. Keith Emge, Jr., Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the State Tax Exemption:
An Analysis of the Issues Since Utah Country v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 9 VA. TAX
REv. 599 (1990).
6. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. The
history of the IRS Rulings is discussed in Robert Bromberg, Financing Health Care and the
Effect of the Tax Law, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 156 (1975).
When the Internal Revenue Code grants preferential treatment to particular kinds of in-
come through exclusions, credits, or deductions, the government spends money on the under-
lying object of that income as if it had appropriated the funds. Congress, however, has not
traditionally subjected this type of tax expenditure to the same scrutiny as direct expendi-
tures. See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in The National Budget,
22 NAT'L. TAX J. 244 (1969); Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining Tax
Expenditures, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 79 (1980); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM (1973).
7. M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond the Mirage of Charity: Not-for-Profit Hospitals and the
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the exemption to an obligation to provide free and below-cost care.8
In another variation on this theme, public officials in some states
have proposed that not-for-profit hospitals be taxed to support state
contributions to Medicaid.9
The common financing mechanism underlying these current and
proposed obligations is the shifting of indigent care costs to those
who pay for hospital care.10 Requirements that hospitals provide
emergency care to non-paying patients, honor their Hill-Burton free
care commitments, or provide threshold levels of uncompensated
care in order to remain tax-exempt oblige hospital managers to tap
revenue streams generated by the sale of clinical services." Taxa-
tion of not-for-profit hospitals to support state Medicaid programs
would also siphon off clinical revenues to finance care for the poor,
albeit with state Medicaid programs acting as intermediaries. Hos-
pitals cannot draw from their own resources to support care for the
poor except by shifting the cost to paying customers.
To elected officials, such cost-shifting is highly tempting. In
Federal Income Tax Exemption (Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript [hereinafter Bloche,
Mirage of Charity]).
8. The Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Rec E395 (1991); H.R. 1374, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong.
Rec E896 (1991) (introduced by Rep. Brian J. Donnelly [hereinafter Donnelly '91]). For a
comprehensive review of these proposals, see Colombo & Hall, supra note 5, at 11-27;
Thomas R. Barker, Reexamining the 501(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable Organi-
zations, 48 TAx NoTES 339 (1990) (Barker was legislative director to Rep. Donnelly).
9. Donald P. Baker & John F. Harris, Wilder Seeks Health Care Provider Tax, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 9, 1992, at A23; Eric Weissenstein, Va. Provider Tax Voted Down But Not Out:
Mayor ofD.C. Hatching a Levy of Her Own, 22 MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 17, 1992, at 4. It
should be noted that District of Columbia teaching hospitals already claim to give about $70
million annually in uncompensated health care to District residents and would resist any
"fixed formula" contribution in lieu of taxes. Jonetta R. Barras, Little Change of Survival
Seen for Kelly's Gross Receipts Tax, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1992, at B1. Minnesota has also
been aggressive in attempting to tax hospitals, including those in bordering states and in
Canada. See Minnesota's Tax on Hospitals Raises Temperatures in Neighboring States, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 1992 at Al (tax report column).
10. Sidney Marchasin, Cost Shifting: How One Hospital Does It, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
1991, at AS.
11. As has been widely noted in recent years, the typical not-for-profit hospital is an
essentially commercial enterprise. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835; Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Fho Profits from Nonprofits?, 65
HARV. Bus. REv. 93 (1987). The average not-for-profit hospital today receives a negligible
portion of its income from charity or other non-commercial sources. M. Gregg Bloche, Cor-
porate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1035 (1992); see also comments
made by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709
P.2d 265, 273 (Utah 1985) (hospital not supported by gifts or donations); Mark A. Hall &
John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitalk Toward a Donative Theory
of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307,406 n.350 (1991) (donations amount to 1% or 2%
of operating funds).
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contrast to public financing of health care for the poor out of gen-
eral tax revenues, cost-shifting occurs below the political water-
line.12 Its growing burden is carried quietly, by employers and
employees who tolerate rising insurance premiums and hospital
charges but who loudly protest at the first hint of higher taxes.
Measured against the seeming political imprudence of advocating
higher taxes to finance care for the poor,13 requiring hospitals to
bear the cost has compelling appeal. It provides some care to poor
people who need it. America's hospitals delivered about $10 billion
worth of uncompensated care in 1989, 14albeit much less than is
widely held to be necessary. It also appeals to public perceptions of
free care as charity and of hospitals as wealthy institutions.
Between 1980 and 1989, uncompensated care costs 5 incurred
12. Some private health care payers also benefit from cost shifting. Large employers
with substantial market power are able to negotiate reimbursement rates that pay health care
providers at less than actual cost, forcing providers to shift costs on to small businesses or
non-group purchasers. See Allen Dobson & Richard L. Clarke, Shifting is No Solution to
Problem of Increasing Cost, HEALTHCARE FmN. MGMT. 24, 32 (July 1992).
13. The negative media response encountered by the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on
Comprehensive Health Care (the Pepper Commission) in 1990, when the Commission pro-
posed $86 billion in new federal spending to provide health insurance to all Americans is
illustrative. See generally Robert J. Samuelson, Lure of the Free Lunch, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 1990, at A25 (editorial). Legislators willing to risk voters' wrath by raising taxes to sup-
port even limited expansion of federal health insurance learned a painful lesson in 1989. Af-
ter Congress expanded Medicare's benefits for catastrophic illness by enacting the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act, an enterprising direct mail firm alarmed senior citizens into re-
belling against a tax on wealthy Medicare beneficiaries levied to finance the new coverage.
Sixteen months later, on November 22, 1989, Congress repealed most of the new benefits by
enacting the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103
Stat. 1979. See Joseph C. Morreale, The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988: Issues
of Equity in a Policy Reversal, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 117 (1991).
14. Jack Ashby, The Trend and Distribution of Uncompensated Care Costs, 1980-1989 4
(1991) (study done on behalf of the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission) [hereinaf-
ter ProPAC]; see also ProPAC Finds Hospitals Record About $7 Billion Profit in 1990, 19
PENS. REP. (BNA) 423 (1992) (statement by ProPAC Executive Director Donald A. Young
on March 3, 1992 that hospitals lost $22.4 billion in 1990 on Medicare and Medicaid patients
and those without insurance, but made up this loss by charging private insurers an average of
38% more than actual cost).
15. Uncompensated care costs represent the sum of bad debt and charity care costs.
Frank A. Sloan, Identifying the Issues: A Statistical Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPrrAL
CARE 16 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986). Studies of charity care expenses and volume
usually employ uncompensated care as a statistical surrogate for charity care because of the
difficulty of distinguishing between charity care and bad debt. Accounting authorities have
not agreed on a method for separating the two, and individual hospitals draw this line in
different ways. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has recog-
nized that it may be impossible to draw a bright line between charity and bad debt. See J.
William Tillett & William R. Titera, What AICPA Audit Guide Revisions Mean for Providers,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1990, at 55-56 (discussion of the AICPA's Audits of Prov-
iders of Health Care Services, which govern audits of financial statements after July 15,
[V/ol. 2:141
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by American hospitals nearly tripled.16 In the same period, these
expenses rose from 3.5 to 4.9% of not-for-profit hospitals' total
costs.17 Uncompensated care costs are being pushed upward not
only by the legal developments just discussed, but also by growth in
the number of Americans unable to afford private health insur-
ance. I I Ironically, soaring health insurance prices (now rising at a
rate well ahead of the pace of medical inflation 9) are to a substan-
tial extent a consequence of the shifting of uncompensated care
costs to paying customers. A positive feedback loop has been set in
place, with pernicious results. Rising premiums price increasing
numbers of individuals and small employers out of the health insur-
ance market, burdening hospitals with higher uncompensated care
1990); David M. Flynn, Hospital Charity Care Standards, J. TAX'N. OF EXEMPT ORG. 21
(Winter 1992); David Burda, Charity Carv" Are Hospitals Giving Their Fair Share?, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, June 15, 1992, at 1 (some hospitals may distort charity data on purpose). The
distinction between charity and extension of credit to a bad risk is hardly obvious, especially
since hospitals generally bill all their patients. Moreover, hospitals tend not to perform com-
prehensive means tests to determine patients' eligibility for free care; thus hospitals lack the
information necessary to make a distinction based on patients' financial ability to pay. Even
if hospital managers had such information, determining eligibility for charity would be a
problematic endeavor, involving value-laden decisions about the personal sacrifices people
should be expected to make to pay for hospital care.
16. ProPAC, supra note 14, at 4 (uncompensated care costs incurred by hospitals receiv-
ing payments under Medicare's prospective payment system rose from $3.6 billion in 1980 to
$10.0 billion in 1989).
17. Id. at 8. See also Malcolm Gladwell, Insurance System Squeezes Some Hospitals,
WASH. POST, March 29, 1992, at A9.
18. The number of uninsured rose from approximately 25 million to 35 million during
the 1980's. Most are lower income Americans; many are children. Blacks and Hispanics are
more likely to lack health insurance than whites. See Peter Ries, Advance Data No. 201:
Characteristics of Persons With and Without Health Care Coverage: United States, 1989,
Nat'l Center for Health Statistics (1991) (available from Nat'l. Center for Health Statistics,
DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 91-1250). See also Edwin Chen, Medical Care May be Reach-
ing Turning Point, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991 at Al; Rebecca Piirto, Young Are Most Lacking
In Health Insurance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1992, at BI (discussion of Census Bureau data
for the fourth quarter of 1990); Claire Spiegel, Uninsured Children Pay a Price, L.A. TIMES,
June 23, 1992, at Al (children without health insurance are 50% more likely to suffer health
problems than those in families with insurance); Cathy Trost, Middle-Class Families Often
Lack Insurance For Children's Health, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1992, at Al; Michael Waldholz,
Uninsured Infants Taken to Hospital Get Fewer Services, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1991, at B3.
The Bush administration contends that the impact of uninsured status upon access to
medical care has been exaggerated by critics. Argues Dr. Louis Sullivan, U.S. Secretary of
Health and Human Services: "Most (uninsured) do receive care in our city hospitals, commu-
nity clinics and free care in our physicians offices. The actual number without care is quite
small." Jack Houston, Health Care Chief Claims Few Get No Care, CHL TRiB., April 27,
1990, at M6.
19. Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access
for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 255, 259 (1990). It should be noted that medical
inflation itself is more than double the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index.
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costs. These costs are then shifted to health care payers, forcing
further premium increases.
Recently, the shifting of uncompensated care costs to paying
customers has come under growing criticism. Business leaders and
some economists have warned that burdening large employers with
a disproportionate share of these costs could undermine American
industrial competitiveness. 20 Several academic commentators have
decried such cost-shifting as a hidden tax, imposed upon unwilling
payers via undemocratic means.2" This method of financing care
for the poor is also open to criticisms from the perspective of its
purported beneficiaries. It falls far short of meeting the poor's med-
ical needs, while encouraging Americans to see these needs as an-
swerable without comprehensive health care financing reform. The
care it finances is largely hospital-centered and crisis-oriented.
Moreover, access to care financed by the covert shifting of costs to
paying patients is contingent upon the discretion of hospital bureau-
crats; it does not rest upon poor people's right or other just claim to
health services.22
This paper addresses a question not yet considered in the litera-
ture on cross-subsidization of care for the poor out of revenues from
paying patients. If such cross-subsidization is, in effect, a privately-
levied tax, how does it compare in progressivity to taxes collected
by governments? This question is of large policy significance be-
cause public officials are so tempted by cost-shifting's political ap-
peal as a substitute for tax-supported care for the poor. If cost-
shifting is in fact less progressive than taxes levied by governments,
then its political appeal, rooted in popular images of hospitals as
centers of philanthropic wealth, rests on an illusion.
20. Perhaps the best known critic is Chrysler Corporation's Lee Iacocca. He has repeat-
edly pointed out the burden health care costs places on his products. See LEE IACOCCA &
SONNY KLIENFIELD, TALKING STRAIGHT 260 (1988) (health care costs approximately $600
per car between 1985-1987). General Motors, another example, spent about $930 on health
benefits for every vehicle it sold in 1991. Joseph B. White, GM Is Headed for Clash With
Workers Over Reductions in Jobs, Health Benefits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1992 at A3. See
also DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, Why Conservatives Don't Talk About America's Health
Care System, May 24, 1991, at 9 (comparison of U.S. and European health care costs as
related to manufacturing operations).
21. E.g., Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry? 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1417, 1429 (1980).
22. Bloche, Mirage of Charity, supra note 7. See also E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Contain-
ment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1718 (1987) (discussing the ethical
impact of health care cost containment).
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To evaluate the progressivity of cross-subsidization,2 3 we devel-
oped a way to estimate, for a given personal income bracket, the
average "tax" levied by the health care system to finance uncom-
pensated hospital care. We then compared the average uncompen-
sated care "tax" rates for several income brackets. Our estimated
"tax" rates are approximate: multiple methodological difficulties
made precision unattainable with the resources available to us.
However, the findings from our "tax" rate comparisons are striking.
The average uncompensated care "tax" rate drops sharply as per-
sonal income rises from working class levels to middle and upper
tax brackets. Cross-subsidization, it appears, is a profoundly regres-
sive way to finance care for the poor.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. A Basic Framework for Measuring the Effect on Consumers
of Hospital Cross-subsidization
In order to evaluate the distribution of the burden of cross-sub-
sidization across income brackets, we must identify and measure
the consumer payments that finance cross-subsidization.24 These
payments fall into two categories - direct (out of pocket) payments
from consumers to hospitals, and consumer payments channelled
indirectly to hospitals through third-party payers.
1. Increased Costs to Consumers
Consumers' direct payments to hospitals are one source of fi-
nancing for undercompensated care. The rate at which consumers'
income is "taxed" (to finance undercompensated care) when they
make out-of-pocket payments to hospitals is a function of how
much consumers pay to hospitals and the rate at which hospitals
"overcharge" consumers in order to subsidize undercompensated
care.
25
Consumer income channelled via third-party payers to fund un-
dercompensated care represents another component of the "hidden
tax". Insurers pass on their share of cross-subsidization costs in the
form of higher premiums. When employers self-insure, they incur
the added cost of cross-subsidization as an additional expenditure
23. We use the terms "cross-subsidization" and "cost-shifting" interchangeably in this
Article.
24. For a mathematical explanation, see Formulas 9 & 10 in Appendix A.
25. Mathematically, this burden is represented in Appendix A, Formula 1.
1992]
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on labor.26 The pervasive role of insurance in health care financing
makes this an essential factor to consider. If we know what portion
of health insurance premium dollars is used to pay hospital-related
claims, and what fraction of the payments is channelled by hospitals
to pay for undercompensated care, then we can measure this por-
tion of the hospital cross-subsidization "tax." The cost to the indi-
vidual consumer will be total premium payments (direct payments
by employees plus employer contributions27) times the fraction of
premium dollars that are paid through to hospitals, times the por-
tion of these hospital payments used to fund undercompensated
care.
2 8
2. Correcting for the Proportional Benefit of Tax Expenditures
Consumers receive a tax benefit that might offset (or aggravate)
the regressivity of cross-subsidization. This benefit is the value of
certain tax expenditures to consumers paying health care bills.
These tax expenditures should be considered because they represent
subsidies by government for the purchase of health care. We con-
sider three: the medical expense deduction,29the treatment of em-
ployer contributions to health insurance as non-income,30 and
employee designated health care reimbursement accounts excluda-
ble from gross income.3
The medical expense deduction32 allows taxpayers who incur
heavy medical expenses to take a limited below-the-line33 deduc-
tion. The consumer first totals all allowable medical expenses; the
extent to which this total exceeds 7.5% of Adjusted Gross Income
is then deductible.34 Part of the value of this deduction should be
26. Conventional economic wisdom holds that all fringe benefit expenditures (including
the cost of cross-subsidization) translates entirely into wage reductions.
27. Employer contributions should be counted because they represent foregone income
to the employee. That is, employers are presumed to offer better benefits packages in lieu of
higher employee salaries.
28. This cost is represented mathematically in Appendix A, Formulas 2 & 3.
29. See I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1992). The general rule of § 213(a) is that deductions
for all medical and dental expenses paid by the taxpayer for himself, his spouse, and depen-
dents are deductible. Only those expenditures for medical care which are not reimbursed by
insurance may be taken as deductions.
30. See I.R.C. § 106 (West Supp. 1992). The general rule of § 106 is that coverage
under an accident or health plan that is financed by an employer is not taxable to the em-
ployee provided the employee is not self-employed or a shareholder in an S corporation.
31. See I.R.C. § 501 (c)(a) (West Supp. 1992).
32. I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1992).
33. "Below-the-line" itemized deductions are those that are subtracted from Adjusted
Gross Income in order to determine Taxable Income.
34. Id. The 7.5% deductibility allows a deduction in a year in which any medical ex-
[Vol. 2:141
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considered as an offset to the consumer's "hidden" bill for un-
dercompensated care. If we view the cost of cross-subsidization as a
"hidden tax," then this "tax" is, itself, deductible through operation
of the medical expense deduction. To correct for this effect, we
should reduce the consumer's estimated cross-subsidization "tax"
bill by that fraction of the medical expense deduction attributable to
hospital cost shifting. This fraction is established by dividing de-
ductible cross-subsidization costs by the total of deductible medical
expenses. The "adjusted" benefit, therefore, is the gross benefit to
consumers of the medical expenses deduction multiplied by the ra-
tio of direct (out of pocket) plus indirect (via third-party payers)
hospital cross-subsidy payments to total medical expenses35 for each
income bracket studied. This adjusted benefit should be subtracted
from the figure derived in Section IIA(l) to correct for the medical
expense deduction.
The second benefit to consider is the failure to treat employer
contributions to employee health insurance as taxable income.3 6
Without this benefit, employees would have to pay tax on the value
of their employers' contributions. The tax liability that employees
elude requires another correction. As before, consumers should be
credited with the fraction of the tax benefit that flows from em-
ployer contributions toward hospital cross-subsidization. This frac-
tion is equal to the gross tax benefit times the fraction of premium
dollars paid through to hospitals times the rate of hospital cross-
subsidy.37
The last tax benefit we consider is the use of employee-desig-
nated health care reimbursement funds.38 When these funds are
available, they allow employees to designate a portion of their in-
come to be restricted for use only to pay uninsured health care ex-
penses. Money deposited in the fund is not taxed as income, but
can only be used to pay for health care not otherwise reimbursable
under a health insurance plan.39 This operates as an above-the-line
deduction.4' As before, the value of this benefit must be adjusted to
penses are so great they absorb a large portion of the taxpayer's income and affect the ability
to pay taxes.
35. This is represented mathematically in Appendix A, Formula 5.
36. See I.R.C. § 106 (West Supp. 1992). This is, in effect, an above-the-line deduction.
See Joint Committee On Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
1988-1992, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at J-1 to J-8 (March 2, 1987).
37. Mathematically, this is expressed in Appendix A, Formula 4.
38. See I.R.C. § 105(West Supp. 1992).
39. See id. Note also that monies in the fund are not used to pay insurance premiums.
40. "Above-the-line" deductions are those subtracted in order to arrive at Adjusted
19921
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reflect that portion attributable to hospital cross-subsidization.
This adjusted benefit equals the gross benefit times the ratio of hos-
pital cross-subsidy payments from the fund to total payments from
the fund.41
3. Summary of Analytic Framework
To recap, the cost of hospital cross-subsidization to consumers
is the sum of (1) direct payments to hospitals multiplied by the
cross-subsidy rate, and (2) the portion of insurance premiums that
end up going to hospitals multiplied by the cross-subsidization rate,
LESS the value of certain tax benefits to the extent that they are
attributable to hospital cross-subsidy payments.42 The manner in
which these costs vary with income will determine whether hospital
cross-subsidization costs represent an increasing or decreasing per-
centage of consumer income as consumer income increases.4
B. Quantifying the Costs to Consumers of Hospital Cross-
subsidization (Percentage of Consumer Spending that
Subsidizes Undercompensated Care)
1. Cross-subsidization Rate for Undercompensated Care"
Measuring the hospital cross-subsidy rate is a subject of great
controversy. However, a study prepared by the Prospective Pay-
ment Assessment Commission (a non-partisan Congressional advi-
sory body) indicates that private payers (both individuals and their
insurers) pay an average of 28% over and above the "actual" cost of
health care due to undercompensated care costs.45 Thus, 22% of
the average private-payer hospital bill is the result of cost shifting
Gross Income. In this case, employers shift employee income into restricted funds and de-
crease the employee's "income" as reported to the Internal Revenue Service on Form W-2.
41. This value is expressed mathematically in Appendix A, Formula 6. Since monies
not spent by the end of the fiscal year are forfeited, this could be a cost rather than a benefit.
Consumers may only spend money from designated funds on health care, and the potential
exists that some designated money might remain unspent at the end of the year. If enough
money remains unspent, the loss of disposable income could outweigh the tax savings realized
through the deduction.
42. This is expressed mathematically in Appendix A, Formulas 7 & 8.
43. This concept is expressed in the differential equations in Appendix A, Formulas 9 &
10.
44. Described as R in Appendix A.
45. Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Optional Payment Rates for Private
Payers Based on Medicare's Methods, Congressional Report C-92-03 (Mar. 1992) at 40 (Table
2-1).
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for undercompensated care." This figure of 22% , then, is the hos-
pital cross-subsidy rate.
There is an important assumption inherent in our use of a con-
stant cross-subsidization rate - that the rate remains constant as
consumer incomes varies. While there are wide variations among
individual hospitals in the degree of cross-subsidization, 47 this paper
focuses on the aggregate picture, and there is little evidence to sug-
gest that as a function of personal income, patients are systemati-
cally attracted to hospitals with higher or lower cross-subsidization
rates.4" Employing a constant rate with respect to cross-subsidiza-
tion financed by third-party payers seems reasonable since there is
no evidence to indicate that third-party payers' reimbursement
agreements with hospitals vary systematically according to patient
income.49 To the extent that there is any systematic variation,
lower income status is most likely to be correlated with higher reim-
bursement rates, since lower-income insureds more typically obtain
coverage on their own or via small employers. In reimbursement
negotiations with providers, insurance plans that cover such indi-
viduals typically lack the bargaining power exercised by large em-
ployee groups to drive reimbursement rates down.
2. Portion of Premium Dollars Paid Through to Hospitals5"
According to the American Hospital Association, in 1988 pri-
vate insurers received $216.8 billion in premiums and paid out
46. If a patient's health care costs (not including cross-subsidy) total $100, and the pa-
tient actually pays S128, then 22% of his bill is funding cross subsidy ($28/$128 = 22%).
47. Teaching hospitals and municipal hospitals in urban areas tend to provide more
"undercompensated care" than do other types of hospitals. The General Accounting Office
examined uncompensated care in Des Moines, Ann Arbor, and Albany. It found that most
uncompensated care was provided by either a government-owned hospital or a major teach-
ing nonprofit facility. See GAO, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS - BETTER STANDARDS NEEDED
FOR TAx ExEMPTION 35 (1990) (GAO HRD-90-84). In another study of 985 "charity"
patients in 28 Indiana hospitals, 82.1% sought care in urban hospitals. See Terrell W. Zol-
linger et al., A Determination of Institutional and Patient Factors Affecting Uncompensated
Hospital Care, 36 Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 243, 247 (1991).
48. Conceivably, lower income-paying patients may be concentrated in municipal and
other government hospitals. These hospitals tend to report the highest rates of cross-subsidy
in the industry. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & ELLEN J. HOLLINGSWORTH, CONTROVERSY ABOUT
AMERIcAN HOsPrTALS: FUNDING, OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANcE 138, 140-42 (1987). If
this is true, then an even higher percentage of low income consumer payments to hospitals
will be used to fund undercompensated care.
49. Many insurers have been accused of establishing "risk factors" which serve to sys-
tematically disadvantage members of racial or other minorities. (For example, insurance
companies charge higher rates to inner-city residents than to rural residents.) Thus, it may be
that there is a correlation between income levels and cost of comparable coverage.
50. Expressed through Appendix A as r.
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$89.4 billion in claims to hospitals."1 Thus, we concluded that 41.2
cents of every private insurer premium dollar is subsequently paid
to hospitals.5 2 As with the cross-subsidization rate above, this as-
sumes that this rate is a constant with respect to varying consumer
income levels.
3. Measuring Consumer Payments to Hospitals53 and Insurers54
We looked to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expen-
diture Survey to measure direct consumer payments to hospitals as
well as consumer payments to private insurers. The Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey is a comprehensive measure of how much money
Americans spend on various commodities. In order to determine
whether health care expenditures expressed as percentage of income
decrease with increasing income, we looked at the study's report of
health care expenditures and expressed these as percentages of
"before tax income."55 This effort was complicated by the manner
in which the study reports data.
A limitation of the study is that it consists of aggregate data,
expressed as mean expenditures for different income ranges. For
example, the study reports that households with reference members
age 25-54 and before tax income between $15,000 and $20,000 spent
an average of $327 on health insurance in 1988-89.56 This average
marks large variations between the health insurance expenditures of
different households within this income group. Thus, these aver-
ages express group members' mean financial risk, not individual
group members' actual experiences.
We restricted our examination of the survey population to those
households reporting $10,000 of before tax income or greater. In
this manner we reduced the problem of "artificially" low income
individuals and families - households whose reported income and
actual wealth bear little connection with one another. Such individ-
uals and households report paper losses or possess unreported
means of support. Examples include college students counted as
separate "consumer units" or a self-employed person receiving only
$3,000 in payments in a given year while delaying compensation for
ongoing projects. Our concern is supported by the observation that
51. American Hospital Association 1988 Annual Survey.
52. That is, in Appendix A: r = $89.4/$216.8 = 0.412.
53. Described in Appendix A as CH.
54. Described throughout Appendix A as C1.
55. See generally Table 1.
56. See 1988-89 Consumer Expenditure Survey Table 24-26.
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for consumer units in the $5,000 to $10,000 range of before tax in-
come the mean cash outlay for purchased new cars or trucks was
only $197, compared to $448 for consumers in the $0 to $5,000
range. 1 Likewise, the mean expenditure by household in the
$15,000 to $20,000 range on college tuition was $86, households in
the $10,000 to $15,000 range spent a mean of $73, but households
in the $0 to $5,000 range spent a mean of $275 on college tuition. 8
Finally, in the report section detailing change in assets, consumers
in the $10,000 to $15,000 range reported the mean value of a newly
purchased home as $768, consumers in the $5,000 to $10,000 range
reported a mean figure of only $216, but consumers in the $0 to
$5,000 range reported the mean value of newly purchased homes as
$1,042." 9 Clearly, there are people in these lowest income brackets
who are able to purchase costly new cars and homes, as well as
students who have unreported means of support.
Additionally, to make comparisons with income tax rates, we
had to rely on tax data indexed by "adjusted gross income" as re-
ported to the Internal Revenue Service. The study's definition of
"before tax income" includes some money and benefits that nor-
mally would not be reported to the I.R.S. Thus, we sought to in-
clude only Consumer Expenditure Survey study populations whose
"before tax income" would more closely approximate their "ad-
justed gross income." This was another reason to use only house-
holds reporting a before tax income of $10,000 or greater.
C. Employer Contributions for Health Care' °
If employer contributions to health insurance are viewed as part
of the employee's compensation package, then these contributions
represent an expense to the consumer/employee. Unfortunately, we
were unable to locate data on employer contributions to health in-
surance correlated by employee income. If employer contributions
in fact represent a higher percentage of employee income as income
rises, their effect would be to make hospital cross-subsidization of
undercompensated care less regressive. Employee benefit econo-
mists at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, however, estimate that em-
ployer contribution to health care expressed in absolute dollars do
not vary substantially with employee income.61 If so, employer
57. Table 1200, CES Survey (1989).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Expressed throughout Appendix A as El.
61. This statement is buttressed by Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Cost In-
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contributions to health insurance, expressed as a percentage of em-
ployee compensation, probably fall as employee income rises.62
D. Quantifying the Cost of Hospital Cross-subsidization to
Consumers - Financial Benefits Due to Tax
Expenditures
We have no data on the tax benefit provided by the characteriza-
tion of employer health insurance contributions as non-income.
63
We also have no data on the use of employee-designated health care
reimbursement funds.64 We suspect, however, that this latter tax
expenditure may operate in a regressive manner since it is a compli-
cated concept and may not be widely understood or exploited by
low income workers.65
There is data, however, on the medical expense deduction. To
measure the value to consumers of the medical expense deduction,
we analyzed the 1988 Statistics of Income published by the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. We discovered that this tax expenditure is
progressive in nature. Lower income return filers have a greater
percentage point reduction in tax liability than high income filers.66
For example, the mean medical expense deduction tax expenditure
for all returns filed by those whose Adjusted Gross Income was be-
tween 10 and 15 thousand dollars was 0.262% of Adjusted Gross
Income.67 In contrast, the mean tax expenditure for those whose
dexes and Levels, 1975-90 (Oct. 1990) (Bulletin 2372), which indicates generally that employ-
ers tend to pay greater insurance benefits, expressed as percentage of mean income, to
workers in job description categories where mean incomes are lower. Although the "insur-
ance" benefits in this study include non-health insurance, the great majority of the insurance
benefit costs reported are health insurance costs.
This study is of limited utility for our analysis, however, since the benefits are indexed by
job category and not by income. Wage levels can seriously overlap between job classifications
and weaken conclusions about the variation of benefits with respect solely to income. For
example, while professional employees as a class receive a higher mean wage and lower insur-
ance benefits (expressed as percentage of wages) than manufacturing employees, there are
undoubtedly some professionals earning less than some manufacturing employees. In such
cases, it may well be that the "rich" blue collar employee has a much better health care
package (expressed as percentage of wages) than the "poor" accountant.
62. That is, (d/dX) (EIRr) in Appendix A, Formula 10, is negative.
63. Expressed throughout Appendix A as BE,.
64. Expressed throughout Appendix A as BEr.
65. A study on the use of this particular tax deduction might be helpful.
66. See Appendix B, Row 8.
67. Analysis of health care deduction statistics as reported in 1988 Statistics of Income
(Treasury Dept.). See Appendix B, Row 8. The standard disclaimers about aggregate data
apply. Consider, for example, that fewer than 7% of tax payers claim this deduction. This
means that of all those claiming the deduction, the tax expenditure is closer to 2.5% of AGI.
See Appendix B, Row 7.
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Adjusted Gross Income was between 20 and 30 thousand dollars
was only 0.108% of Adjusted Gross Income.6" As discussed above,
this tax expenditure must be adjusted to reflect the fact that only
some of it resulted from payments for hospital cross subsidization.6 9
We previously described how we calculated direct consumer
payments to hospitals, consumer payments to insurers, and the rate
at which premiums flow through to hospitals in the form of pay-
ments. In order to calculate the adjusted value of the medical ex-
pense deduction, we need data for the sum of all consumer
payments that count as "Medical Expenses" for purposes of the de-
duction.7" In our calculations, we used the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) report of "Total Health Care" Expenditures as a sur-
rogate for this number. This probably understates the true value of
total deductions because the tax code recognizes a wide variety of
expenditures as "medical expenses" that are probably not reported
as "health care expenses" in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.71
Finally, there may be a problem comparing data from the Statis-
tics of Income (SOI) with that from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey. SOI data is indexed by Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) as
that term is defined in the tax code. CES data is indexed by "Before
Tax Income," which includes all beneficial receipts to each house-
hold including some items which would not appear in Adjusted
Gross Income. Such items include gifts of clothing and furniture.
However, we believe that by restricting our inquiry group to house-
holds reporting $10,000 or greater, we have excluded most of this
"unusual" income, leaving us with income that would be reported
on a tax return.72
III. FINDINGS
The cost of hospitals' cross-subsidization of undercompensated
68. Id.
69. See text accompanying notes 32-35.
70. Expressed as CME in Formula 5, Appendix A.
71. See Fed. Taxes (P--) 116,380(c) (1989) (list of expenses deductible under the tax
code). "Medical Expenses" include such unusual items as special school tuition for handi-
capped individuals, braille books and magazines, and "medically necessary" home improve-
ments such as central air conditioning for a child with cystic fibrosis. Id.
While consumers (and their accountants) might strain to find expenses that qualify as
medical expenses on their tax returns, we believe it doubtful that someone responding to the
Consumer Expenditure Survey would include items such as braille magazines in her "health
care" expenditure total.
Understating this number ("C'U" in Appendix A) will tend to overstate the adjusted
value of the deduction. See Formula 5, Appendix A.
72. See text accompanying notes 56-57.
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care, indexed by before-tax income, is summarized in Table 1. Row
1 of the Table indicates the number of households responding to the
Consumer Expenditure Survey and the mean before-tax income of
those households within each of six income brackets. Row 2 indi-
cates the mean total household expenditure on health care for the
year within each income bracket. We have also expressed this as a
percentage of mean before-tax income.
Moving to the components that make up this total health care
cost, Row 3 reports mean annual household direct payments to hos-
pitals (out of pocket payments). This represents the sum of survey
subjects' responses to two items - annual payments for "hospital
room" and for "hospital service other than room." We have also
expressed these totals as percentages of mean before-tax income.
Row 4 indicates the mean annual household expenditure on pri-
vate health insurance. This is the sum of responses to four survey
items - annual expenditures for "commercial health insurance,"
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, "health maintenance plans," and
"commercial Medicare supplements and other health insurance."
Again, we have expressed these totals as percentages of mean
before-tax income.
Row 5, indirect payments to hospitals through third-party pay-
ers, results from multiplying the sum of private insurance expendi-
tures (Row 4) by the fraction of private health insurance dollars
that are paid through to hospitals.7 3
Row 6, total consumer payments to hospitals, is the sum of di-
rect consumer payments to hospitals (Row 3) and indirect con-
sumer payments to hospitals (Row 5). Multiplying this total
payment by the cross-subsidy rate (22%) yields the annual mean
consumer expenditure on hospital cross-subsidization for each in-
come bracket. These expenditures are reported in Row 7 and
graphically displayed in Figure 1. We have again expressed these
totals as percentages of before tax income.
The resulting data indicate that the consumers in the lowest in-
come bracket we studied ($10,000 to $15,000) spent approximately
0.45 percent of their before-tax income on hospital cross-subsidiza-
tion. This is more than four times the 0.1 % of before-tax income
spent by consumers in the highest income bracket ($50,000+) to
subsidize care for patients not fully paying their own expenses.74
Correcting for the tax deductibility of medical expenses does not
73. See text accompanying notes 50-52.
74. See Table 1, Row 7; Figure 1.
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significantly change this picture. While this tax benefit is moder-
ately progressive, the corrective offset it generates against consumer
spending on cross-subsidization of undercompensated care is mini-
mal in relative terms.75
While we do not have data for employer contributions to health
insurance and the use of employee-designated health care reim-
bursement funds, there is reason to suspect that each of these repre-
sents a higher percentage of personal income as income falls.7 6
We conclude that there is a strong negative correlation between
75. The data on the benefit provided by the medical expenses deduction indexed by
adjusted gross income is summarized in Table 2, Appendix B. Row 1 reports the number of
tax returns filed and the mean adjusted gross income reported. Row 2 reports the number of
returns claiming the medical expense deduction, and Row 3 reports the mean deduction they
claimed. This last figure was calculated by taking the total of all deductions and dividing by
the number of returns claiming the deduction. We have also expressed the mean deduction as
percentage of mean adjusted gross income earned by all taxpayers within each bracket (to
derive this figure, taxpayers who did not claim the deduction were deemed to have claimed a
zero dollar deduction). Subtracting the mean deduction from the mean adjusted gross in-
come resulted in the mean post-deduction income reported in Row 4.
The gross benefit provided by the deduction is reflected in Rows 5 to 7. The mean federal
income tax liability on pre-deduction income is reported in Row 5. We based this estimate on
liability of 15% for the first $25,000 of income, 28% on income between $25,000 and
$70,000, and 33% on amounts in excess of $70,000. (This is obviously only an approximate
means of calculating pre-deduction liability.) We then estimated tax liability on mean post-
deduction income (Row 4) using the same methodology. This reduced liability is reported in
Row 6. The difference between these liabilities represents the mean gross value of the medical
expense deduction to all those taxpayers taking the deduction, and is reported in Row 7. This
estimate, of course, assumes that the medical expense deduction is the first dollar deducted
from adjusted gross income. That is, taxpayers claim this deduction along with many others.
Since the tax rates are graduated by income, a truer measure would be to find the value of all
deductions claimed and then to apportion the benefits pro rata, but we are without the means
to calculate the benefit in this manner. Since we are assuming a "first dollar deducted" scena-
rio, and we are using Consumer Expenditure Survey data as a surrogate for total deductible
expenses, see text accompanying notes 53-59, we have probably overstated the absolute value
of the tax benefit.
At this point, we have only shown the mean tax benefit gained by taxpayers actually
claiming the deduction in one year. We can, however, frame this as a benefit to all taxpayers
if we multiply the mean tax benefit gained by claimants by the probability of recovering this
benefit in a given year - i.e. the number of taxpayers claiming the deduction in the tax year
divided by the total number of taxpayers. This value is reported in Row 8. It is the mean
benefit that a taxpayer can expect to recover in a given year.
Finally, for purposes of our discussion, we must adjust this benefit to reflect the portion
attributable to cross-subsidization of undercompensated hospital care. See text accompany-
ing notes 63-72. First we take the benefit expressed in Row 8 times the ratio of direct and
indirect hospital payments to all medical payments. This is expressed in Row 9. Finally, we
calculate the portion of this benefit attributable to consumer hospital cross-subsidy payments
by multiplying the figure in Row 9 by the cross-subsidy rate (22%). This figure is reported in
Row 10. The values reported in Row 10 for each income bracket show a moderately progres-
sive distribution of the tax benefits derived from deduction of cross-subsidization costs.
76. See text accompanying notes 60-62.
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consumer income and the net cost of hospital cross-subsidization of
undercompensated care, expressed as percentage of income. The
magnitude of this cost is also considerable -nearly one half percent
of pre-tax income for consumers in the $10,000 to $15,000 income
bracket and one tenth percent of pre-tax income for consumers in
the $50,000+ bracket. This regressive pattern contrasts sharply
with the progressive profile of effective federal income tax rates for
the income brackets we consider in this article. This profile is dis-
played in Figure 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cross-subsidization, in short, is an extremely regressive way to
finance hospital care for the poor. This should hardly be surprising.
Hospital expenses incurred by patients who pay are distributed re-
gressively across income brackets, so the shifting of uncompensated
care costs to the bills of paying patients (and their insurers) predict-
ably yields the distributive pattern reported here. Thus, in view of
Americans' preference for progressive taxation, the political mar-
ketability of public policies that encourage or require cross-subsidi-
zation is puzzling, to say the least.
An explanation may lie in lingering perceptions of not-for-profit
hospitals as reservoirs of philanthropic wealth. Popular under-
standing of these institutions has yet to pierce the voluntaristic veil.
The resources collected by these institutions from paying customers
are widely perceived as a philanthropic pool to be tapped, even as
taxes levied by governments are resented as an intrusion. The real-
ity of cost-shifting seems to be either unrecognized or misappre-
hended as redistribution of resources obtained from the well-off.
Our findings confirm that these perceptions and understandings
are illusory. The financing of not-for-profit hospitals' "charitable"
generosity is extraordinarily regressive, especially in comparison
with the progressive distribution of federal income taxation. This
regressivity is a potent argument for expanded public financing of
health care for the poor. Given the American public's mounting
concern about tax fairness, this argument could have deep political
resonance.
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APPENDIX A: MATHEMATICAL FORMULAS
The cost of hospital cross-subsidization attributable to direct
consumer payments to hospitals can be described as
CH'R (1)
where CH represents total direct consumer payments to hospitals
expressed as a percentage of income, and R is the cross-subsidiza-
tion rate. That is, R is the proportion of the hospital payment used
to subsidize undercompensated care.
The cost of hospital cross-subsidization attributable to direct
consumer payments to private health insurers can be described as
CIOR*r (2)
where C, represents consumer payments for insurance premiums
expressed as percentage of income, r is the portion of premium dol-
lars paid out to hospitals by insurers, and R is the cross-subsidiza-
tion rate explained in Formula 1, supra.
The cost of hospital cross-subsidization to consumers as a result
of employer payments to private health insurance plans can be de-
scribed as
E1*r*R (3)
where El represents employer contributions for insurance premiums
expressed as percentage of income, r is the portion of premium dol-
lars paid out to hospitals by insurers, and R is the cross-subsidiza-
tion rate explained in Formula 1, supra.
The benefit to consumers resulting from the tax code's treatment
of employer contributions to health insurance as non-income, to the
extent it is attributable to hospital cross-subsidy payments, can be
expressed as
BEI'r*R (4)
where BE, is the total tax expenditure to the consumer resulting
from the treatment of employer contributions for health insurance
as non-income, expressed as percentage of income, r represents the
insurance flow-through rate to hospitals, and R is the cross-subsidi-
zation rate. See Formula 2, supra.
The benefit to consumers of the medical expense tax deduction,
to the extent that it is attributable to hospital cross-subsidy pay-
ments (TME), can be expressed as
TMi = BME 0 (CH+CIr)R/CME (5)
where BmE is the total benefit to the consumer of the medical ex-
pense tax deduction expressed as percentage of income, CH repre-
sents direct payments to hospitals by the consumer (as above), CI
represents direct consumer payments for insurance premiums (as
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above), r represents the rate which insurance premium dollars are
paid to hospitals (as above), CmE represents the total "medical ex-
penses" claimed by consumers in tax returns, and R is the cross-
subsidization rate (as above).
The tax benefit to consumers from employee-designated health
care reimbursement funds, to the extent that it is attributable to
hospital cross-subsidy payments (TEF), can be expressed as
TEF = BEF * (FSR/FT) (6)
where BEF is the total benefit to the consumer of the tax-exempt
fund expressed as percentage of income, Fs represents payments
from the fund to hospitals, and FT represents total payments from
the fund.
Combining the above formulas, we see that the total cost of hos-
pital cross-subsidization to consumers, expressed as percentage of
income (P), can be described as
P = CHR + CIRr + EIRr - (BEI*Rr + TME + TEF) (7)
This is algebraically equivalent to
P = CHR + C1Rr - TME + (EI-BEI)Rr - TEF (8)
We list the terms representing consumer payments to hospitals and
the medical expense tax deduction first because we have data for
these figures. We group the two employer contribution terms as a
reminder that the tax benefit (BEI) is directly dependent upon, and
will not exceed, the employer contribution to health insurance (E).
Taking this last formula one step further, the manner in which
the cost of hospital cross-subsidization varies with respect to con-
sumer income can be expressed as the differential
(d/dX)P = (d/dX) [CHR + CIRr - TME + (EI-BEI)Rr - TEF](9)
or
(d/dX)P = (d/dX)(CHR) + (d/dX)(CIRr) - (d/dX)TM (10)
+ (d/dX)(ERr) - (d/dX)(BEIRr) - (d/dX)TEF
where X represents total consumer income and all other variables
are defined as above.
In this paper, we present data which leads us to conclude that
the terms "(d/dX)(CHR)" and "(d/dX)(CiRr)" are both sharply
negative. We also present data which leads us to conclude that the
term "(d/dX)TME" is negative, but insignificant when compared
with the first two terms. We conclude from other sources that the
term "(d/dX)(ERr)" is probably negative, but we have no reliable
data on this issue. Finally, we have no data for the last two terms of
equation 10. From the data we do have, we conclude that
162 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 2:141
"(d/dX)P" is negative. The extreme degree to which the first two
terms are negative leads us to believe that "(d/dX)P" is also sharply
negative.
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